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Human reliability analysis (HRA) may be performed prospectively for a newly designed system or 
retrospectively for an as-built system, typically in response to a safety incident. The SPAR-H HRA method 
was originally developed for retrospective analysis in the U.S. nuclear industry. As HRA has found homes in 
new safety critical areas, HRA methods developed predominantly for nuclear power applications are being 
used in novel ways. The Petro-HRA method represents a significant adaptation of the SPAR-H method for 
petroleum applications. Current guidance on Petro-HRA considers only prospective applications of the 
method, such as for review of new systems to be installed at offshore installations. In this paper, we review 
retrospective applications of Petro-HRA and analyze the Macando Oil Well-Deepwater Horizon accident as 
a case study.
BACKGROUND
Human reliability analysis (HRA) was originally 
established in the U.S. to ensure minimal human errors 
during weapons assembly work, but the approach was 
quickly adapted for other safety critical applications, 
particularly control room operations in nuclear power plants.
Since the advent of the first HRA method, the Technique for 
Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP; Swain and 
Guttmann, 1983), numerous HRA methods have been 
developed. These methods allow analysts to determine 
causes of human errors and quantify the human error 
probability. Yet, much of the focus of HRA has remained in 
nuclear power, where risk-informed safety regulation 
mandates the use of HRA in risk analyses and plant 
licensing. 
HRA is nonetheless growing in popularity outside nuclear 
power. Safety critical domains such as aerospace, military, 
chemical process control, transportation, and oil and gas are 
seeing increased interest in HRA to support a broader 
application of risk and safety analysis in those fields.
HRA is increasingly applied in oil and gas. Boring (2015)
has noted there are fundamental differences between the 
nuclear power and oil and gas domains. Key differences 
include: the types and configurations of control rooms and 
operations centers, the types of processes being controlled, 
the types of technologies being used, the types of hazards 
and consequences, the specification level of the written 
procedures, and the safety culture at the facilities. It is 
therefore reasonable to question many of the operational 
assumptions underlying different HRA methods and to 
develop new HRA methods or adapt existing HRA methods 
to better support the context of oil and gas. From a risk
analysis perspective, nuclear power typically features 
considerably more comprehensive probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) models, which allow easy incorporation 
of HRA. Lacking such PRA models in many cases, the HRA 
used for petroleum applications must be much more 
standalone than its nuclear power counterparts. 
One method that’s been developed to date to address these 
differences is the Petro-HRA method, which will be 
described in the next section.
THE PETRO-HRA METHOD
Developing a New HRA Method for Oil and Gas
Although HRA had been applied in the oil and gas 
industry historically to a limited extent, a sudden increase 
occurred after the 2010 oil and gas blowout incident at the 
Macondo Oil Well, and there were subsequent mandates to 
look towards the nuclear industry and their incorporation of 
human aspects in risk analysis through HRA. In many 
countries, there are new requirements to model HRA, 
creating a regulatory framework similar to that found in the 
nuclear power industry.
In 2012, the Research Council of Norway and the Statoil 
crown corporation funded a new research project to refine or 
develop an HRA method specific for oil and gas applications 
for the Norwegian oil shelf. Although primarily involving 
Norwegian partners (i.e., Norwegian University of Science 
and Technology, DNV-GL, Institute for Energy Technology, 
and SINTEF, plus Idaho National Laboratory), the approach 
would be generalizable to other countries and their oil and 
gas applications in drilling, production, and transportation.
The four-year research project resulted in the publication 
of the Petro-HRA Guideline (Bye et al., 2017). The Petro-
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HRA method was developed to meet the needs of the oil and 
gas industry through reviewing and adapting existing HRA 
methods, best practice documents, and research on human 
performance. Petro-HRA was created to be a complete HRA 
method including steps on: scenario definition, qualitative 
data collection, task analysis, human error identification, 
human error modeling, human error quantification, and 
human error reduction. This is contrary to most HRA 
methods where many of these steps are not described. For 
example, many simplified HRA methods from the nuclear 
power industry focus primarily on human error 
quantification. This focus is possible because many other 
steps are already specified as part of the PRA. Absent the 
PRA, it was necessary to make these implied steps explicit 
requirements in the method.
Origins in SPAR-H
After reviewing several HRA approaches, the Petro-HRA 
project team decided to use the Standardized Plant Analysis 
Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H; Gertman et al., 
2005) method as the basis for Petro-HRA. SPAR-H is 
designed to be a simplified method for human error 
quantification. Because SPAR-H was originally built around
SPAR PRA models, it came with clearly defined human 
failure events that minimized the need for extensive model 
building and qualitative analysis. However, when removed 
from the SPAR models, SPAR-H lacked clear guidance on 
building the HRA leading up to quantification. Thus, the 
Petro-HRA method can be seen as filling in gaps toward a 
complete SPAR-H HRA method. In addition to filling in 
gaps, the Petro-HRA method reconsidered the performance 
shaping factors (PSFs) used in SPAR-H. The PSFs account 
for the context that primes or decreases human error, and 
these proved to be different for nuclear power vs. oil and gas.
The original version of SPAR-H (Blackman and Byers, 
1995) was developed to support the Accident Sequence 
Precursor (ASP) program at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC). ASP is invoked when there is a 
reportable incident at a U.S. nuclear power plant. The 
purpose of this retrospective analysis is to determine the 
likelihood that a similar incident could happen again or 
elsewhere. Although the probability of the incident 
happening is 1.0, because the incident actually happened, the 
probability of a similar event happening is usually less than 
1.0. The goal of ASP is to determine if the risk of recurrence 
requires corrective action at the plant or similar plant. Is it a 
given that the same thing would happen again given a similar 
context? If so, it’s necessary to implement corrective actions 
to reduce the risk of recurrence.
SPAR-H provided a mechanism to support improved 
human error quantification. One of the struggles that the U.S. 
NRC was facing in ASP was the ability to quantify a wide 
range of human errors that resulted from a variety of factors.  
Any new method needed flexibility. In addition, the validity 
and reliability of the quantification of human errors had been 
questioned such that the method needed to have a firm basis 
in theory as well as an approach that improved reliability. To 
address these issues the decision was made to base the model 
on an underlying model of human cognition, namely 
information processing. 
The SPAR-H development team began with an 
information processing model and then identified factors that 
would affect each element of the model as well as factors 
that might influence the execution of a response elected as a 
result of the information processing. This was done to ensure 
a level of completeness and transparency in the method in 
terms of the relevant psychological elements.  The next step 
was to do the same for the operational factors found in the
environment of a nuclear power plant.  These operational 
factors were identified and then attached to the appropriate 
elements of the information processing and response model 
previously identified. This resulted in a description of how 
humans make decisions and respond, and the factors that 
would ultimately impact their ability to successfully do so.  
In order to produce a workable method, these factors—both 
psychological and operational—were then examined to 
produce a set of summary factors for use in the method.  
These summary factors became the SPAR-H PSFs: available 
time, complexity, stress and stressors, experience and 
training, procedures, ergonomics and the human-machine 
interface, fitness for duty, and work processes (including 
crew dynamics).  The background information generated 
through the model development and factor identification and 
definition then provided the information necessary to define 
the factors in a way meaningful to those involved in the 
nuclear industry.  
The final step was then to devise an approach for 
quantification.  The team believed that by knowing what 
factors influenced performance that essentially built the 
context of the situation, they could assess their influence and 
in turn use that knowledge to modify a nominal error rate.
The team used THERP (Swain and Guttmann, 1983) as well 
as the open literature as a source to determine both the base 
rates and the multipliers that could be used to assess the 
impact of the level of the PSFs.  By doing so, the team was 
able to create worksheets that could be used in a
straightforward fashion to quantify the human error once the 
PSFs were assessed.  After the original development, the 
method went through a series of modifications and is 
currently best described in NUREG/CR-6883 (Gertman et 
al., 2005).
Retrospective vs. Prospective Analysis
As noted, Petro-HRA is an expansion of the SPAR-H
method. Yet, an important distinction between the two 
variants is that SPAR-H was developed for retrospective 
analysis, while Petro-HRA was developed for prospective 
analysis. Retrospective analysis refers to investigation of an 
incident that has already occurred, while prospective analysis 
refers to anticipated performance. Retrospective analysis is 
commonly associated with accident investigation, although 
most incidents investigated do not rise to the level of severity 
of an accident. Prospective analysis is commonly associated 
with quantifying the safety of new systems. It is not always 
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possible to anticipate every factor that will influence 
operator performance within a system that hasn’t actually 
been installed yet. As such, prospective analyses tend to be 
at a higher level with generic or nominal behaviors assumed 
and modeled. When an incident actually occurs, this may cue 
a more thorough analysis, in which all details are available.
Some PSFs in SPAR-H are inherently retrospective. In 
almost no cases, for example, would an analyst assume 
degraded fitness for duty by those using the system. Fitness 
for duty is a condition in which the user is not in a mental or 
physical state to operate the system. Factors ranging from 
psychological stress to medications or psychoactive drugs 
may negatively impact performance, but rarely would these 
be considered prospectively. Fitness for duty is a PSF that 
can be applied retrospectively in the unlikely event that staff 
are found to have violated safety protocols related to fitness.
In this paper, we explore the use of Petro-HRA for 
retrospective analysis. Retrospective analysis is of particular 
interest to the regulators of oil and gas installations, because 
it enables the regulators to determine root causes of an 
incident after the fact and use those root causes to trend 
vulnerabilities at similar installations and prescribe 
corrective actions to prevent recurrence. In the next section, 
we review the Macando Oil Well accident involving 
Deepwater Horizon. This well-documented event provides a 
useful example of how retrospective HRA can provide 
insights into the causes of events and the prevention of 
similar events in the future.
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS CASE STUDY
Human Actions in the Macando Oil Well Accident
On April 20, 2010, an oil and gas blowout event at the 
Macondo Oil Well caused an explosion and fire that resulted 
in 11 fatalities, 17 seriously injured personnel, the sinking of 
the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) drilling rig, and the 
devastating release of millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf 
of Mexico (U.S. Chemical Safety Board, 2014). The accident 
can be attributed, in part, to a failure to detect the kick and 
subsequent blowout or uncontrolled release of oil and gas 
hydrocarbons from the well. The backpressure drove the 
hydrocarbons through the drilling apparatus to the rig, where 
they were ignited in an explosion that subsequently set fire to 
the rig. The rig had finished the exploratory drilling phase of 
operations and was in the process of performing temporary 
well-abandonment activities to prepare the well for the 
production phase of operations that another rig was 
scheduled to perform.
The well-abandonment activities entail plugging the well 
with cement, ensuring the integrity of the cement plugs via a 
negative pressure test, and then retracting the drilling 
apparatus. The negative pressure test circulates chemically 
treated mud that serves as the primary barrier to prevent the 
hydrocarbon from traveling through the well and into the 
drilling apparatus. The negative pressure created by 
circulating the mud simulates the low pressure seafloor 
atmosphere in order to verify the cement plug is properly 
sealing the well. Pressure and flow indications were 
available to the drilling team, but due to urgency to finish the 
drilling phase of operations they went unnoticed until the 
negative pressure test was performed. A supervising 
representative from BP overseeing the drilling operation did 
raise a concern to the driller; however, any concern was 
alleviated by more experienced drilling team members 
stating the odd pressure values were not uncommon and did 
not merit any significant concerns. Operations resumed, 
though the undetected kick had occurred up to an hour prior 
and was continuing to worsen over time until ultimately the 
blowout alarm sounded at 9:47 PM, followed swiftly by the 
explosion and fire. The order to abandon ship was issued at 
10:00 PM.
Human Failure Events
The evolution of a well kick event follows in two phases.
First, there is the initial phase prior to the personnel 
becoming aware of the well kick (which might be called
normal operations). Even though the well kick has actually 
occurred, the personnel involved in the drilling or 
completion activities have not yet changed their activities to 
respond to the well kick. The second phase entails response 
to the well kick after the personnel detect the well kick. At 
this point, there is a sudden change in the activities of the 
drill operators and support personnel. We have characterized 
the event broadly as two Human Failure Events (HFEs)
related to well kick (see Figure 1 for a simple graphical 
depiction).
Figure 1. Example well kick HFEs in sequence.
In reality, the recovery activities consist of many separate 
HFEs. However, the general context as represented by the 
PSFs for each of those post well kick activities largely 
remains the same. Additionally, if there is a failure to detect 
the well kick, there is obviously little opportunity for 
recovery actions nor the need to model a second HFE. 
Petro-HRA Analysis
The nominal or default human error probability (HEP) in 
Petro-HRA is 0.01. Petro-HRA, like SPAR-H, uses the 
nominal HEP to represent basic tasks performed within the 
HFE. These nominal HEPs are then modified using 
multipliers corresponding to different levels of influence of 
the PSFs.
Petro-HRA makes use of nine PSFs: time; threat stress;
task complexity; experience/training; procedures; human-
machine interface; attitudes to safety, work and management 
support; teamwork; and physical working environment. This 
list omits fitness for duty and work processes from SPAR-H
and adds attitudes to safety, teamwork, and physical working 
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environment as new PSFs. Some PSFs—threat stress and 
task complexity—have been relabeled to remove some 
ambiguity in the original SPAR-H terminology.
Generally, the Petro-HRA PSFs can have three types of 
effects:
? Negative: A negative effect means that the PSF 
decreases human reliability. For example, to denote the 
negative effect of time would mean to suggest that there 
was inadequate time available to complete the task
reliably.
? Nominal: A nominal effect means that the default 
applies. Nominal time, for example, suggests that 
there’s adequate time to complete the task without 
undue time pressure or extra time.
? Positive: A positive effect means that the PSF increases 
human reliability. Positive time means that there is extra 
time over what is needed to accomplish the task.
For our two example HFEs, the following PSF effects 
could be noted. For detection of the well kick (HFE1), the 
time available will vary considerably from situation to 
situation. Because there are indicators of an impending well 
kick such as the negative pressure test, there is generally a 
window of time to respond and prevent the event. However, 
if these indicators go unheeded, the available time erodes, 
and the ability of the drilling crew to respond decreases 
proportionately to the decreasing time window. It may be 
assumed that when a well kick is impending, the available 
time to detect will adversely affect the HEP. The clock is 
ticking, so to speak, which can only operate negatively on 
the outcome of the event. Of course, there is considerable 
task complexity involved, and in the case of DWH, there was 
degraded equipment (human-machine interface) resulting in 
poor indicators due to the backlog of maintenance activities.
All other PSFs are assumed to be nominal.
The detection of a well kick triggers a change: response 
actions are needed in order to prevent a blowout (HFE2). 
This operational shift will generally result in multiple 
elevated negative PSFs relative to nominal or normal 
operations. The time window is closing, but there may also 
be elevated negative threat stress and task complexity, 
potentially diminished levels of experience and training for 
this type of situation, and potentially poor to incomplete 
procedures. Underlying the situation, negative teamwork and 
management support factors such as breakdowns in 
communication, coordination, or command and control may 
also manifest. Finally, even in the presence of clear well kick 
indications, there was considerable hesitancy to perform an 
emergency disconnect due to the extreme cost associated 
with that action and job penalties for a false alarm. These 
factors suggest the PSF related to attitudes toward safety, 
work, and management support was at play.
While detection of the well kick (HFE1) can be seen as a 
mostly nominal influence of the PSFs, the transition to 
emergency operations to prevent blowout (HFE2) will likely 
invoke multiple negative PSFs.
The Basic HEP is defined in Petro-HRA as the nominal 
HEP multiplied by the product of all PSF multipliers:
Basic HEP = 
?????????????? ????? ??????????
For HFE1 related to well kick detection, the PSF product is 
calculated to consider negative effects of time (moderately
negative has a multiplier of 10), task complexity (moderately 
negative has a multiplier of 10), and human-machine 
interface (moderately negative has a multiplier of 10). All 
other PSFs are considered nominal, with a multiplier equal to 
1:
HEPHFE1 =
0.01 × 10 × 1 × 10 × 1 × 1 × 10 × 50 × 1 × 1 ? 1.0
According to the laws of probability, this number is, of 
course, truncated at HEP = 1.0, suggesting that given the 
circumstances, the well kick detection would almost 
certainly have been doomed to failure. 
The same process applies to HFE2 related to the response 
to the well kick. Again, multiple negative PSFs are in effect, 
including: time (very highly negative has a multiplier of 50), 
threat stress (very highly negative has a multiplier of 25), 
task complexity (very highly negative has a multiplier of 50), 
experience and training (very highly negative has a 
multiplier of 50), procedures (very highly negative has a 
multiplier of 50), and management support (very highly 
negative has a multiplier of 50). Even assuming the 
remaining PSFs are nominal, the HEP quickly escalates to 
certain failure: 
HEPHFE2 =
0.01 × 50 × 25 × 50 × 50 × 50 × 1 × 50 × 1 × 1 ? 1.0
A prospective analysis, in contrast, might have assumed
nominal PSFs for HFE1 and primarily weighted time as a 
factor in responding to the detection for HFE2. Both would 
have resulted in HEPs below 1.0, likely HEP = 0.01 for 
HFE1 and HEP = 0.1 (considering a moderately negative 
time PSF multiplier equal to 10) for HFE2. In other words, a 
prospective HRA would likely have underestimated the 
number of simultaneously negative factors contributing to 
the event. Indeed, the situation at DWH may be considered a 
worst-case scenario, and it would never be assumed that the 
confluence of so many negative events would actually occur. 
Except, they did.
Discussion
What can be learned from the retrospective analysis of the 
Macando Well accident? The analysis would only seem to 
confirm that many negative things happened, resulting in the 
accident. More telling, however, is that the negative PSFs 
implicated for HFE1 involving detecting the well kick 
occurred over a prolonged state. The negative PSFs of time, 
complexity (given the degraded facility conditions), and 
missing indicators due to a faulty human-machine interface 
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resulted in an ongoing degraded condition at DWH. While it 
is easy to say in hindsight that these conditions primed
failure, the fact that the risks associated with these degraded 
states and lack of risk-informed decision making regarding 
decisions to finalize drilling and move quickly to production 
fatally undermined the safety of DWH. The retrospective 
analysis shows not only that DWH was doomed to failure 
but that it had been operating that way for some time. Of 
course, this assessment is not an indictment on any of the 
individuals working on DWH. There is no individual blame 
in HRA. Multiple factors put DWH in jeopardy, and the 
retrospective analysis reveals factors to watch to avoid 
similar incidents at other installations.
CONCLUSIONS
While the primary goal of a retrospective analysis is to 
identify leading indicators to the failure, another goal is to 
generalize the findings to other installations. Within nuclear 
power, there are a number of commonalities between 
nuclear power plants, which makes it relatively easy to 
generalize findings to the fleet of related plants. Drilling 
rigs may represent more unique configurations that are 
increasingly tailored to first-of-a-kind applications. Easy-to-
reach oil has now been exhausted, meaning it requires 
increasingly unique solutions to tap new oil sources. As 
such, the generalizability of a retrospective analysis from 
one installation to another may be limited. The value in 
retrospective analysis may reside mostly as a root cause tool 
to ensure similar human performance deficits aren’t 
mirrored across different installations.
Several of the PSF multipliers in Petro-HRA are higher
than in SPAR-H. It might therefore be concluded that Petro-
HRA is more conservative than SPAR-H. This conservatism 
should be considered when performing a retrospective 
analysis. It may be desirable to benchmark the Petro-HRA 
method against other HRA methods like SPAR-H that have 
been used retrospectively.
In general HRA, methods have a nominal HEP which is 
increased as contextual factors degrade the situation. While 
some methods also include the potential to decrease the 
HEP through positive factors, the emphasis is certainly on 
negative factors. This can lead to a situation where the more 
you know about a scenario the higher the HEP becomes (as 
fewer and fewer factors are assumed nominal). As a 
retrospective analysis often is done on an incident/accident 
scenario that has occurred it is likely to produce a rather 
high HEP. But the high HEP should not be driven by the 
fact that the quality and amount of information from an 
event investigation used in a retrospective analysis will 
likely be much different than that coming from a 
prospective analysis. The Petro-HRA method should be
benchmarked against other HRA methods that have been 
used in retrospective analyses. Additional guidance should 
be developed for Petro-HRA to determine the best way to 
apply the Petro-HRA steps retrospectively. New guidance 
will ensure that information from event investigations is 
consistent to inform the HRA.
Retrospective analysis using Petro-HRA promises to be 
an important tool to the regulator of oil and gas applications. 
It affords a method to extract the primary human 
contributions to an event and to mitigate such contributions 
in the future. This paper has presented a case study of such 
an application and points to the potential for wider use in 
the future.
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